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ABSTRACT
United States policy makers are promoting bio-fuels as an economic development opportunity, especially
for rural America. A USDA study claims that developments in energy production from biomass could increase
profits for agricultural commodity producers. However, as William Heffernan and his colleagues have
demonstrated, concentration in the agrifood sector limits the economic benefits going to the commodity
producers. Relying on Heffernan’s framework, we compare the distribution of intellectual property of corn and
other genetically modified crops with that of the emerging biomass technologies. We find that patent
ownership in the emerging biofuel sector is not yet as concentrated as in the agricultural biotechnology sector.
However, theories of private ordering predict concentration and our data indicate that concentration is
occurring. The results suggest that rural biomass producers are unlikely to gain broad economic benefits from
the biofuel economy.
Proponents of the emerging biofuel economy often emphasize one or more of
three potential benefits: environmentally friendly energy sources, greater national
energy independence, and rural economic development (see Coleman and Stanturf
2006; De La Torre Ugarte et al. 2003; Doornbosch and Steenblik 2007; Sexton and
Zilberman 2008). Many factors may influence the likelihood that these benefits will
be realized. This paper considers some factors that may limit the achievement of
broad economic benefits. 
Experts contend that biofuel processing facilities should be geographically
diffuse and locally owned to promote broader environmental and economic benefits
(Coleman and Stanturf 2006; Meyer 2008; Swenson and Eathington 2006). The
reasoning behind such claims is that, due to the bulkiness of the biomass feedstocks,
energy efficiencies are lost during transportation to distant processing facilities.
Ideally, then, biomass would be processed into fuel closer to the areas where the
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biomass is harvested. Furthermore, the economic benefits in job creation and profit
distribution would likely be enhanced when those diffuse production facilities are
locally owned.
The development of new technologies is another significant factor in
determining potential benefits from biofuels. Pimentel and Patzek (2005) observe
that the amount of fossil fuel energy used to produce corn ethanol and soy and
sunflower biodiesel is higher than the energy extracted. They also present evidence
that ethanol derived from switchgrass and wood “result in a negative energy
return” (Pimentel and Patzek 2005:70). Searchinger et al. (2008) are also skeptical
of the environmental benefits, pointing out that adding more land to crop
production would increase overall carbon emissions. Corn ethanol, for example,
would nearly double greenhouse gas emissions over three decades. Searchinger et
al. (2008) also contend that carbon savings from switchgrass would not occur for
four decades. 
Such critical assessments of the viability of biofuels are often based on existing
technologies. The emerging biomass sources expected to replace corn are being
developed during a period of dynamic research and technological developments.
Switchgrass, hybrid poplar, and willow are examples of new biomass sources, which
can be genetically modified to enhance the efficiency of the ethanol conversion
process. New processing technologies are also being developed. Because of the
reliance on high-technology developments, these emerging technologies are often
called “second-generation biofuels” (Dornbosch and Steenblik 2007). Since many of
these technologies have yet to be fully realized, industry analysts state that they “do
not expect any significant cellulosic ethanol production to occur before 2010,” but
they still claim that research indicates it is a promising new technology (Larson,
Pichel, and Rusch 2006:50).
Because the new raw materials are expected to be raised in traditional farming
and forest plantation contexts, experts predict economic benefits for rural America.
They base this prediction on the simple assumption of a competitive marketplace
in which prices are set by supply and demand. According to textbook economics
(e.g., Schiller 1996), as demand for some thing increases in a competitive
marketplace, the price is likely to rise until supply increases to meet the demand.
For example, Sexton and Zilberman (2008) assert the production of biofuels will
create additional demands for crop production (see also De La Torre Ugarte et al.
2003; Doornbosch and Steenblik 2007). There is evidence that farmers have been
benefitting from the rise of biofuel production. Government mandates for more
ethanol production and other food demands have led to dramatically higher crop
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prices for farmers (Beaubien 2008). However, there are reasons to doubt that this
will continue.
The key assumption behind predictions of economic benefits for biofuel raw
material producers is that markets are competitive. Though few would argue that
markets ever reflect “perfect competition,” economic textbooks often recognize
degrees of “imperfect competition” (Schiller 1996:120). In the agrifood system,
however, calling markets imperfectly competitive may even be misleading.
Agricultural commodities are produced, processed, and eventually distributed
to consumers through a series of transactions that social scientists often call
commodity value chains (McMichael 2008). Value chain is an appropriate label
because each link in the chain represents a market transaction where supply and
demand is assumed to determine the price. However, Heffernan (2000) and others
(Glenna 2003; McMichael 2008) have argued that large agribusinesses have gained
monopolistic and oligopolistic economic control of markets at various links in the
value chains, enabling them to extract profits at the expense of raw material
producers.
We believe that comparing market concentration of agricultural commodities
to the emerging biofuel sector is reasonable because the raw materials for the
biofuel sector are expected to be raised by farmers and private forest owners. The
first generation of biofuel raw material crops include corn and, to a lesser extent,
soy, sunflower, canola and other crops that are also currently raised as agricultural
commodities. The second generation of biofuel raw material crops will consist of
cellulosic crops, including switchgrass, hybrid poplar, and willow. One
characteristic that connects the first and second generations is biotechnology.
Because economic benefits from high-technology industries are often captured by
securing intellectual property on emerging technological breakthroughs, a study
of the concentration of intellectual property may serve as an indicator of which
firms are most likely to benefit economically (Boyd 2003; Enriquez 2001). If a
patented technology becomes the definitive choice, the company controlling that
technology may secure greater control of the market and extend that control to
other links in the commodity chain. Through a comparison of intellectual property
holdings of first and second generation biofuel technologies, we can make a
prediction of the likely distribution of economic benefits for rural America. 
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We present a brief overview on agribusiness concentration in the agrifood
system and then highlight how the emergence of agricultural biotechnology  has1
enabled concentration of intellectual property in the agrifood system. After
presenting a theory on the tendency for intellectual property in high-technology
industries to become consolidated so that firms can generate commercial goods and
services, we compare the intellectual property holdings of genetically modified
(GM) corn, non-corn GM plants, and biofuels. We conclude by describing evidence
suggesting that a similar concentration process is occurring in second-wave biofuels
and consider the implications for rural economic development.
CONCENTRATION IN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AND RURAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
As we have already noted, many predictions of rural economic development rest
on the assumption of competitive markets. Economists often define a market
shifting from competitive to monopolistic or oligopolistic when four or fewer firms
gain control of more than 40% of the market (Heffernan 1999).  Heffernan (2000)2
contends that a small group of agribusinesses has achieved oligopolistic control of
commodity value chains through the strategies of horizontal and vertical
integration. Horizontal integration refers to a small group of companies gaining
greater market share of one segment of a commodity chain. Hendrickson and
Heffernan (2007) demonstrate that a few large agribusinesses now control many
agricultural commodity value chains. For example, four firms control more than
80% of beef packing, more than 60% of pork packing, and 80% of soybean crushing.
Just three firms control 55% of flour milling. 
 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines agricultural biotechnology as, “A range of1
tools, including traditional breeding techniques that alter living organisms, or parts of organisms,
to make or modify products; improve plants or animals; or develop microorganisms for specific
agricultural uses.” (See glossary at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/biotech/biotech_trade.asp.) Some
scientists and USDA officials distinguish “old” biotechnologies (traditional techniques) from “new”
ones. New biotechnology refers to genetic modification (GM) of a plant or animal. In this paper, we
use agricultural biotechnology to refer to the techniques used to modify crops and the GM crops as
the result of using those techniques.
 This is comparable to the legal definition of concentration. The U.S. Department of Justice uses the2
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to calculate market concentration. With this measure,
concentration “is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and
then summing the results.” Markets with and HHI measure between 1000 and 1800 is considered
“moderately concentrated.” A measure over 1800 is considered to be concentrated.
(www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm Downloaded: 3/27/2009).
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Vertical integration refers to a small group of companies gaining control of
multiple segments. For example, a few large companies may gain control of grain
markets and then expand that control over grain milling, feed production, feedlots,
and meat processing (Hendrickson and Heffernan 2007). Farmers selling their
commodities in such oligopolistic markets are not likely to get a fair price.
Highlighting the link between market power and political power is also
important. During the 1970s and 1980, the enforcement of antitrust regulations in
the U.S. was relaxed as regulators sought to “balance the efficiency gains from
concentration with the inefficiencies associated with possible anti-competitive
behavior….” (Rubinfeld 2001:553). This change was influenced by the Chicago
School’s “belief that most markets are competitive, even if they contain a relatively
few number of firms” (Rubinfeld 2001:556). Some scholars use the term
neoliberalism to refer to this belief behind the shift in U.S. public policy (Bonanno
1998; Glenna and Gronski 2008). Heffernan and Constance (1994) credit the weaker
enforcement of antitrust regulations with the rise of corporate consolidation in the
agrifood system. 
This paper focuses particular attention on the emergence of oligopolistic control
of seed markets, because much of the intellectual property for technological
breakthroughs in the agricultural and biofuel sectors is packaged in plants. As
Enriquez (2001:226) has argued, “after engineering a plant’s genes, companies had
to find a way to distribute their product. Seed companies provided a means for the
widespread dispersal of new germ lines.” This led chemical and pharmaceutical
companies to form agricultural biotechnology firms that, in turn, began purchasing
seed companies. 
Although biotechnologies that enable specific genetic modification are 
relatively new, efforts to establish protection for genetic material is an old trend.
Kloppenburg (2004:335), for example, argues that the popular narrative of plant
breeders in the mid-twentieth century developing hybridized corn to enhance yield
is false. He argues, “plant breeders have long pursued hybrids less for their superior
agronomic characteristics than for the ‘biological patent that they confer’”
(Kloppenburg 2004:319). “Biological patent” refers to the fact that hybridization
enabled capitalist accumulation in agriculture because it limits the farmers’ ability
to replant harvested seed. Thus, seed companies could sell seeds to farmers every
planting season. The new agricultural biotechnologies and their accompanying
intellectual property protections enable the private sector to profit from seed
production even in crops lacking that biological patent (Kloppenburg 2004; see also
Aoki 2003; Safrin 2007).
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Intellectual property protection on new biotechnologies refers to a relatively
recent development. The 1980 Supreme Court decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
permitted the patenting of a synthetic living organism. The decision enabled the
patenting of biological and genetic material that was previously considered open
access property (Safrin 2007). Though corn varieties have been developed and
improved by farmers for millennia, scientists are now able to claim property rights
on a corn variety by genetically modifying it (Liptak 2003). 
As seeds became the mechanism for agricultural biotechnology firms to deliver
their intellectual property to agricultural raw material producers, horizontal
consolidation of intellectual property in the agricultural biotechnology sphere gave
way to vertical consolidation throughout the agrifood system (Boyd 2003).
Hendrickson and Heffernan (2007) cite secondary sources describing how a few
companies that had significant holdings of intellectual property began purchasing
seed companies. Two companies, DuPont-Pioneer and Monsanto, account for 56%
of the U.S. seed corn market (see Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). Globally, four
companies account for 29% of the world market in commercial seeds (see UNCTAD
2006). Since Monsanto’s seeds account for 90% of the world’s genetically modified
crop acreage, there is a strong likelihood that they have secured a monopoly (see
Davoudi 2006).
These companies then made alliances with other companies to expand their
control through vertical integration to achieve what one company described as
“farm gate to dinner plate” (Heffernan 1999:7). For example, Cargill became one of
the largest seed firms through acquisitions. However, it needed to form a joint
venture with Monsanto to gain access to intellectual property of plants. Similarly,
Archer Daniels Midland formed an alliance with Novartis (which became
Syngenta); as did ConAgra and DuPont-Pioneer (Heffernan 1999). This served to
solidify control by a few companies of agricultural inputs and commodity
purchasing and processing segments of the agrifood system. The lack of competitive
markets means that farmers are likely to pay more for inputs and receive less for
their commodities. 
Although such consolidation poses long-term economic problems for farmers,
they continue to purchase and plant GM seeds. Since the first major GM
agricultural crops appeared in 1996, the planting of transgenic crops has expanded
dramatically. In the United States, adoption of herbicide tolerant (Ht) soybeans
reached 92% of the soybean acreage in 2008. Ht cotton was planted on 68% of
cotton acreage and Ht corn on 63% in 2008. Insect-resistant crops with the Bt gene
6
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were also adopted widely. Farmers planted Bt cotton on 63% of cotton acreage and
Bt corn on 57% of corn acreage in 2008 (Fernandez-Cornejo 2009).
In 2007, for the twelfth consecutive year, the global area of genetically modified
crops continued to expand rapidly, reaching 282.4 million acres. The number of
countries planting GM crops is currently 23, including 12 developing countries
(James 2007). Enriquez (2001:227) argues that “farmers found that even though the
new seeds were more expensive and sometimes required very restrictive agreements
as to how they should be planted, they did provide significant improvements in
overall yield and profit.” As market concentration continues, however, farmers will
likely find diminishing benefits.
The case of Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready seeds illustrates how powerful
intellectual property rights can affect the interests of farmers. Monsanto (and
similarly situated companies) have a great interest in protecting the innovation
embodied in each seed. For Roundup, this is a genetic modification that makes the
plant resistant to the herbicide, permitting more precise weed control. Protecting
this technology is not easy, since every seed is a copy machine that can duplicate the
modification. Therefore, a farmer could avoid purchasing more seed the next year
by saving some harvest for future planting. To protect its interests, Monsanto uses
a “bag tag” license that prevents farmers from saving seed in subsequent years. To
date, Monsanto has been successful in enforcing its license against individual
farmers (Liptak 2003). In doing so, arguably, it has undermined the tradition of seed
saving and changed the relationship between farmers and seed companies (Aoki
2003; Safrin 2007).
The question is whether such concentration in the seed sector will emerge in the
biofuel sector. There are several reasons that comparing concentration in the
agrifood and biofuel sectors is appropriate. First, like the agrifood sector, there is
consolidation in parts of the energy sector. Policy makers and proponents of self-
regulating energy markets claimed that deregulation of the energy sector would
yield more competition and lower energy prices. However, Blumsack, Apt, and Lave
(2006) find no evidence of consumer or systemic benefits from restructuring. As
economist Kenneth Rose put it, deregulation “hasn’t panned out the way we had
hoped” (Davidson 2007:B1). Second, both agricultural crops and biofuel crops are
based in biotechnology. An important aspect of that biotechnological scientific
research is the generation of intellectual property (Cahoy and Glenna 2009). 
In agricultural biotechnology and the biofuel sector, individual scientists and
engineers, universities, small start-up companies, and large firms invest substantial
research money into making advances in their technological field. They often secure
7
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intellectual property in the process, most commonly through patent protection,
which enables them to charge licensing fees for their inventions. “The holder of a
patent has the legal right to prevent anyone else from making, using, selling, or
importing an object or devise that incorporates any feature covered by the specified
claims” (Jaffe and Lerner 2004:26). Inventors are thereby able to profit from their
investment of resources and ingenuity by preventing others from using their
inventions without first paying for the rights to use them. 
According to the theory of private ordering, then, companies need to secure
some consolidation of intellectual property to bring a product to market (Cahoy and
Glenna 2009). However, although such intellectual property assignments provide
control over a specific technology, the entire sector within which that technology
is applied does not necessarily become monopolized. For example, although the
creation of hybridized corn created a biological patent, many more seed corn dealers
existed through the 1970s and 1980s than exist today (Boyd 2003; Enriquez 2001;
Kloppenburg 2004). With soybean seeds, the top four firms controlled only 5% of
the seed market in 1980, just more than 40% in 1989, and more than 55% in 2007
(Shi and Chavas 2009). Therefore, the market was more competitive in 1980 than
in 2007. Seed markets were more competitive before the emergence of agricultural
biotechnology ushered in a rush by large agricultural chemical and pharmaceutical
companies to purchase seed companies. 
Furthermore, consolidation of intellectual property does not necessarily have
to lead to vertical integration throughout a commodity chain. Although the
agrifood sector is characterized by horizontal and vertical integration by a few large
agribusinesses, it is conceivable that private ordering of intellectual property in the
biofuel sector could coexist with more competitive markets in a broader biofuel
sector. 
Intellectual property concentration in first-generation biofuel feedstocks already
mirrors concentration in agricultural biotechnology because GM corn is the most
common plant in both. However, second-wave biofuels are in the research and
development phase. Since the second-wave biofuels markets are still emerging,
economic benefits still have the potential to be distributed widely. 
To compare relative concentration of the agricultural biotechnology sector and
the second-wave biofuel sector, we drew data from the US Patent and Trademark
Office. We developed four hypotheses to guide our analysis.
• Hypothesis 1: Since the first agricultural biotechnology patent was assigned,
many companies have secured ownership of agricultural biotechnology patents. 
8
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• Hypothesis 2: As of 2008, agricultural biotechnology patents reflect
concentration of ownership. 
• Hypothesis 3: Since the first second-wave biofuel patent was assigned, many
companies have secured ownership of biofuel patents.
• Hypothesis 4: As of 2008, second-wave biofuel patents reflect concentration of
ownership. 
After analyzing the data, we offer a brief discussion of tendencies in the ordering
of intellectual property in high-technology sectors and consider the implications of
these tendencies for the distribution of economic benefits for biomass producers.
DATA AND METHOD
Data for this paper were derived from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) patents database.  We divided the data into three categories: GM corn3
plants, GM non-corn plants, and biofuel technologies. As noted above, comparing
agricultural biotechnology patents with biofuel patents is reasonable because there
are similarities in the science behind the technologies, in the application of the
technologies as a raw materials produced on croplands and forestlands, and in the
types of companies involved. We divided GM corn and GM non-corn plants
because corn was one of the first crops to be genetically modified and many patents
have been granted to discoveries based in corn research. Furthermore, corn is a
significant crop in first-generation biofuels. Therefore, to avoid overlapping
between GM corn and other GM plants, as well as overlaps between GM corn and
biofuels more generally, we treated GM corn as an independent category.
We generated the list of GM corn patents using classification 800,
subclassification 300.1 as a search term (Patents directed to Multicellular Living
Organisms and Unmodified Parts Thereof and Related Processes: Herbicide
resistant plant which is transgenic or mutant, and the plant is maize). To get the list
of non-corn GM patents, we sought patents identified using classification 800,
subclassification 300 as a search term (Patents directed to Multicellular Living
Organisms and Unmodified Parts Thereof and Related Processes: Herbicide
resistant plant which is transgenic or mutant). We chose these two databases
because the contents—patents directed to plants that have been genetically
modified for herbicide resistance—are specific to agricultural biotechnology and are
unlikely to be contaminated with patents related to other industries. For example,
 http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm3
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research on crops to generate pharmaceutical uses would be unlikely to be located
here.
To get a broad representation of the patents related to cellulosic ethanol
production, we accessed the USPTO issued patents database and used a search
string designed to identify all patents containing relevant terms that resided in
plant and microorganism classes: “(ccl/800/$ or ccl/435/$) and ethanol and
(lignocellulos$ or cellulos$) and (fuel or fuels).” All the patents in the resulting
group were individually reviewed to determine actual relevance, and unrelated
patents were discarded. In addition, we compared the search results with an
independent survey of the biofuel patent environment appearing in each issue of the
publication, Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining to ensure that the essential patents
were captured. We acknowledge that the search results may not be a perfect
representation of biofuel patenting, as any search likely results in both type I errors
(non-biofuel patents included) and type II errors (biofuel patents excluded).
However, we remain confident that we have captured a reasonable representation.
Once the lists of patents were identified, we determined patent ownership by
examining information on the face of the patent regarding patent ownership. This
enabled us to determine the number of discrete owners of the patents. We examined
patent assignment data and assembled evidence of joint ventures to determine if
ownership of patents is becoming consolidated. 
ANALYSIS
Nascent development in high technology fields can be greatly affected by
intellectual property environments. As new technological fields move beyond the
early stages of development, it is common for many discrete inventors to secure
patent protection. Widely dispersed ownership can create what legal academics and
economists call “thickets.” Thickets occur in an industry when “there is so much
overlap among the technologies developed by different companies that it is difficult
to bring any product to market without potentially infringing patents held by other
companies” (Jaffe and Lerner 2004:59). 
The lack of assigned intellectual property rights may promote innovation.
Investment in research and development may be seen as worthwhile, because no
single company or small set of companies has yet emerged as clear market leader.
However, as a technology sector matures, a thicket may emerge from overlapping
property rights. These thickets can create obstacles to innovation, because a
company or companies may decide that it is unlikely they could piece together
diffusely owned patented elements of a technology to create a commercial product.
10
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As Cahoy and Glenna (2009:18) contend, “A single product may need to traverse
so many overlapping rights that it requires hundreds if not thousands of licenses for
production.” 
Legal academics and economists refer to the challenge of moving beyond a
patent thicket as a “problem of ordering.” Many of these scholars consider private
ordering to be the ideal solution in a market economy, whereby private firms work
independently of direct government intervention to traverse patent barriers. In
cases where private ordering is not forthcoming, a commonly held view is that
intellectual property rights need to be weakened (Cahoy and Glenna 2009). Cahoy
and Glenna (2009) discuss four ways in which private ordering may emerge. The
first is vertical consolidation: a company may purchase intellectual property from
other companies. The second is joint ventures and cross-licensing: two or more
companies may combine intellectual property and expertise to bring a service or
product to market. The third way, patent pooling, refers to the usually voluntary
creation of a separate entity to provide access to protected information to several
companies for a set royalty fee. A fourth approach is standard setting: an industry
standard may privilege a particular approach to technological development that is
not subject to patent protection or require that any new technological development
fit into an existing infrastructure. 
The discussion on private ordering is important because it has implications for
the distribution of economic benefits along a technological value chain. The goal of
distributing economic benefits may create a dilemma from a policy perspective.
Private ordering refers to efforts by one or more companies to secure overlapping
property rights. A commonly held view regarding private ordering is that it may
be necessary for a single firm or a few companies to gain concentrated control over
a new technological field for new technologies to emerge (Cahoy and Glenna 2009).
To determine if private ordering is occurring, documenting consolidation of diffuse
intellectual properties held by many companies into intellectual properties held by
a few companies is necessary. We analyzed the data to determine number of patents
and number of discrete patent owners. We then examined the mergers and joint
ventures (private ordering) that led to the consolidation of ownership of patents
that we originally owned by smaller companies.
There are 37 discrete owners of the 525 GM corn patents and 118 discrete
owners of the 1013 GM non-corn patents (see Table 1). If the analysis were to stop
there, the conclusion might be that there are multiple companies with intellectual
property holdings of GM agricultural plants. However, a closer analysis of
changing ownership, due to mergers and joint ventures, indicates that the top three
11
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firms in the GM corn category control 85.0% of the patents, and the top 3 firms in
the GM non-corn category control 69.6% of patents. Using the definition of an
oligopoly as four or fewer firms controlling more than 40% of a market, we would
argue that there is evidence to suggest that an oligopoly has emerged in GM
plants.  4








Number of Patents. ........... 525 1013 239
Number of Discrete
Patent Owners. .................. 37 118 77
Percent Ownership by
Top 3 Firms. ....................... 85.0% 69.6% 33.5%
Evidence of the process that generated private ordering in the GM corn and
GM non-corn patent categories exist in the list of owners of the intellectual
property (see Table 2). When 34 discrete firms and universities own the 417 GM
corn plant patents and 114 discrete firms and universities own the 833 GM non-
corn plant patents, there is compelling evidence of a need for consolidation to bring
a product to market. Here, it is likely that large biotechnology agribusinesses
consolidated their intellectual property holdings by securing ownership rights from
other companies. In GM corn plants, DuPont-Pioneer now controls approximately
40%, Monsanto 37%, and Syngenta 10%. In non-corn GM plants, Monsanto now
controls approximately 40%, Pioneer 20%, and Syngenta 10%. To put it more
simply, these large companies overcame patent thickets by investing resources to
either purchase companies or form joint ventures with them to assemble the
intellectual property necessary to create a commercial product. 
Concentrated ownership of patents does not guarantee concentrated market
power or vertical integration of other segments of the market. However, for GM
corn and GM non-corn plants, concentrated ownership of intellectual property
coincided with the emergence of horizontal and vertical consolidation of market
power (Boyd 2003; Enriquez 2001; Hendrickson and Heffernan 2007). Furthermore,
as Heffernan et al.’s (1999) discussion on the formation of agrifood clusters (e.g.,
 An HHI analysis would be needed to determine if consolidation in this market met the DOJ’s4
definition of oligopoly.
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Monsanto/Cargill) indicates, these companies also used joint ventures and
purchases to integrate vertically. 
Table 2. PATENT OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION
Monsanto.............. Asgrow, Stine Seeds (shared), Delta Pine, Seminis,
Calgene, Emergent Genetics, Agracetus, Dekalb, Holden’s
Foundation, MGI Pharma, First Line
Pioneer Hi-Bred. . DuPont, Hybrinova, Mertec, EvoGene, Bigemma
Bayer Crop Sci..... Aventis, Rhone Poulenc Rhorer, Hoescht, Schering,
AgrEvo, Plant Genetic Systems
Syngenta. .............. Novartis, Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz, Advanta, Garst, Northrup
King, Mogen, Zeneca, J.C. Robinson, Golden Harvest
Dow. ...................... Cargill, Agrigentics, Mycogen, Illinois Foundation
Limagrain. ............ Soygenetics, Harris Moran
BASF. .................... American Cyanamid
Danisco. ................ Genencor, Xyrofin
Verenium. ............. Diversa, Celunol
When we apply the same approach to analyzing the biofuel sector, we find that
oligopolistic concentration of intellectual property has yet to emerge (see Table 1).
Currently, 77 discrete firms and universities own 239 patents, and the top 3 firms
own 33.5%. Although this is a substantial level of consolidation, it is not yet as
concentrated as GM corn patents or GM non-corn plant patents. However, there
is evidence that private ordering, which would likely lead to consolidation, is
already emerging in the biofuel sector. Private ordering through horizontal
integration and joint ventures is evident in the fact that Danisco has secured the
patents of Genencor and Xyrofin, and Verenium has secured the patents of Diversa
and Celunol. This suggests that these companies are consolidating intellectual
property portfolios. 
We also compare change in concentration of patents in GM corn, non-GM corn,
and biofuel technologies (See Chart 1). In each case, concentration drops when new
patents are assigned to new discrete patent holders. However, new patents are also
assigned to large companies that already hold many patents. Furthermore, those
larger companies gain control of patents assigned to smaller firms through joint
ventures and other efforts. These processes explain the general trend of increasing
concentration in agricultural biotechnologies and second-wave biofuels over time.
Concentration of second-wave biofuels is still not above the 40% threshold, at which
point some consider the market to no longer be competitive. However, the trend in
patent ownership over the past few years has been toward greater concentration,
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with the three largest companies, Danisco, Novozymes, and Midwest Research,
controlling an increasing share.
Chart 1. PATENT OWNERSHIP BY TOP 3 FIRMS OVER TIME
The biofuel sector is still in an early stage of research and development. As
significant technological breakthroughs continue, there is a high probability that
the top firms in the biofuel sector will begin to mirror the patent ownership pattern
in the agricultural biotechnology sector. Our data indicates that biofuel companies
are moving in the direction of horizontal integration of intellectual property. These
new technologies will need to be implemented in a commodity chain that includes
production, collection and transportation, and processing of biomass, similar to the
agrifood system. A likely strategy will be to vertically integrate into clusters with
large agribusinesses like Archer Daniels Midland or Cargill, just as agricultural
biotechnology firms did. 
CONCLUSION
In their explanation of why deregulation of the energy sector failed to yield
benefits to consumers, Blumsack et al. (2006:16) contend that “Deregulation became
the end, rather than a means, of benefiting society.” They note that there are many
policy options available for restructuring that market, which could distribute
economic benefits more broadly. However, policy makers did not adopt these
approaches because they held a “blind faith” in markets to self regulate. When
markets are restructured to allow private entities to manage affairs without direct
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government intervention, they still require close monitoring and interventions to
punish violators (Blumsack et al. 2006). Yet monitoring and government
interventions are the first casualties of deregulation efforts, since proponents of
deregulation often pledge their allegiance to self-regulating markets. By this logic,
there is no need for government oversight. 
Whether it is ideology, corporate power over the political process, some
combination of the two, or lack of awareness of the issues, policy makers have
devoted insufficient attention to the ways that corporate consolidation might affect
the distribution of economic benefits of the biofuel economy for rural America. It
is not surprising that policy makers are eager to promote biofuels as a solution to
economic problems for farmers and for rural America. Dramatic changes in the
agriculture and food system have led social scientists to speculate on the end of
farming as a family livelihood strategy (Labao and Meyer 2001). Since biofuels have
the potential to lead to higher prices for farm and forestry biomass production,
policy makers may foresee that promoting the biofuel economy will at least slow the
continuing decline of farming as a family livelihood strategy. 
However, in the current policy climate, private ordering of innovations in high
technology areas often bring tradeoffs. Since profit margins are so narrow,
companies may see horizontal integration as necessary to justify investment in
research and development. If companies such as Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta
had not succeeded in consolidating their intellectual property, they might have
lacked adequate incentives to invest in agricultural biotechnology research and
development. For example, because Monsanto could pursue private ordering
through joint ventures and consolidation, its investment in the creation of
herbicide-tolerant and pesticide-producing crops led to innovations that have
introduced more benign herbicides and a reduction in pesticide applications. Thus,
there were some environmental benefits. However, that process of private ordering
also led to the formation of vertically integrated oligopolistic agricultural markets,
which has had negative economic impacts on the farm economy. 
Whether such tradeoffs will emerge in the biofuel sector remains an open
question. Biofuels may provide an opportunity for rural development so long as the
primary benefits will accrue to farmers and forest landowners, to small businesses
that might stimulate job growth, and to rural communities (to the extent that an
influx of money will enhance the rural service sector). Since the future of this
important technology resides in cutting edge research and development advances,
assuming that patents will play an important role is reasonable. An overview of the
current patent ownership landscape suggests that the biofuel patent environment
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is diverse and fractioned. However, using GM crops as a guiding heuristic, we
predict that a pattern of consolidation that has characterized GM crops since the
1990s may emerge in the biofuel sector. Policy makers could conceivably intervene
to enable private ordering of intellectual property, but limit the vertical integration
of that market power into other market segments, such as biomass transport and
processing. However, if large agribusinesses consolidate control of the intellectual
property, it is unlikely that the predicted economic benefits for rural America will
emerge. Although the biofuel technology patents are not currently as concentrated
as GM crop patents, our analysis suggests that greater consolidation is likely to
emerge. Policy makers would need to engage in the kind of complex and pragmatic
policy approaches discussed by Blumsack et al. (2006) to balance the interests of
companies investing in biofuel research and development with the interests of the
biomass producers. Since that has yet to happen, the initial positive economic
benefits of increased agricultural commodity prices may be replaced by lower prices
in less competitive markets for biofuel raw materials.
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